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ABSTRACT 
Data leakage and theft from databases is a dangerous threat to organizations. Data Security and Data 
Privacy protection systems (DSDP) monitor data access and usage to identify leakage or suspicious 
activities that should be investigated. Because of the high velocity nature of database systems, such 
systems audit only a portion of the vast number of transactions that take place. Anomalies are 
investigated by a Security Officer (SO) in order to choose the proper response. In this paper we 
investigate the effect of sampling methods based on the risk the transaction poses and propose a new 
method for "combined sampling" for capturing a more varied sample.  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Databases lie at the heart of IT organizational infrastructure. Organizations monitor database 
operations in real time to prevent data leakage. Data security and data privacy protection (DSDP) 
systems are widely used to help implement security policies and detect attacks and data abuse. DSDP 
systems monitor database (DB) activity and enforce a predefined policy in order to issue alerts about 
policy violations and discover vulnerabilities such as weak passwords or out-of-date software. DSDP 
systems also apply anomaly detection algorithms in an attempt to detect data misuse, data leakage, 
impersonation, and attacks on database systems [1, 2].  
These systems generate alerts when policy rules are violated or anomalous activities are performed 
[3,4,5]. Each alert demands the attention of a security officer (SO) [6] who must decide whether an 
alert represents a threat which should be investigated or dismissed. For investigation purposes, the 
security officer (SO) needs the original log data to be as informative as possible as she needs to 
assemble the passel in order to evaluate the whole picture. Organizations also save this data for 
future investigation in case a breach is discovered later. To address these needs some industrial 
DSDP systems maintain an archive of log data describing past transactions, and these logs are then 
passed on to an anomaly detection system to identify suspicious activity. 
Unlike the network domain, in the data-base security domain organizations prefer not to admit the 
attacks hence there is no indication to which or what portion of the anomalies are “true positives”.   
The databases monitored by DSDP systems serve thousands of users making up to a hundred 
thousand transactions per second. Storage is limited and can become a prohibitive cost for these 
systems, yet the amount of data that is logged affects the quality of anomaly detection and the ability 
to investigate historical data when a breach is discovered. Current solutions for the limited storage 
space are based on defining a policy to govern which portion of the transactions will be saved and 
audited.  
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Most processing solutions for fast streams of log data focus on compressing the data. These include 
various techniques of dimensionality reduction such as PCA, deep learning / auto encoding 
approximation methods (including sketching), and Bloom filters [7,8]. These methods allow 
extracting features without consuming excess memory and disk space. However, saving compressed 
data does not provide SOs with the information required to decide how to respond to anomalies and 
does not facilitate the investigation of past behavior.  
Another approach to reducing the amount of data saved while preserving the full attributes is to 
sample transactions or activities. Techniques for sampling and their effects on anomaly detection 
have been studied in the domain of network traffic flow [9,10,11]. This domain is quite different 
from the domain of database transaction as the data is richer, containing more features, and the 
damage from a single transaction can be greater than the damage from a network packet.  
We propose using a sampling strategy based on the perceived risk posed by each transaction to the 
organization. The risk can be estimated using a manually calibrated policy or estimated using a 
machine learning ranking algorithm such as CyberRank [12].  
We seek a smart monitoring policy based on information theory sampling that will be economical 
(storage-wise), without compromising our ability to discover the same anomalies, and also enable us 
to investigate an anomaly once discovered. 
The main contribution of our work is introducing new feature representing “subject matter expert 
knowledge” for storage reduction and improving performance of DSDP systems while maintaining 
the anomaly detection results and the investigative capabilities as required by the SO and the 
regulator. We present a sampling strategy for incorporating the risk associated with transactions \ 
events and preliminary results on anomaly detection using simulated data.  
2. DATA EXPLORATION 
We collected 24 hours of user activity data from a production DSDP system. The system’s data is 
made of aggregated transactions details such as the IP address, time of the day and description of the 
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preformed query. The users can be ether application data base user or a real user. As described in our 
CyberRank work [12], the user is an important entity whose behavior and activity is useful for 
identifying risk and controlling database transactions. When a transaction occurs, it is compared to 
the user’s history to detect anomalies.  
The data collected consists of 24 hours of monitored DB transactions made by 1,901 unique users. 
We identified three different user behaviors: most users have very little activity with just a few 
queries (less than a thousand queries per user). The second group includes users with a lot of activity 
and thousands of queries. User activity is described in the histogram in Figure 1.    
Figure 1. Histogram of user activity. Most very active users, those with 
over ten thousand transactions, are not depicted. The majority of the 
users had less than 1,000 queries in the time frame inspected 
In this work we concentrate on the largest group of users 
which have a lower number of queries. These users are most 
affected from the sampling strategy as very little information 
is present for each user.  
3. EXPERIMENTAL SETTING 
Our objective was to compare different strategies for sampling transaction data. We look at three 
sampling methods:  
(i) vanilla: keeping a specific portion of the transactions for sampling  
(ii) risky only: sampling only from the transactions labeled as risky 
(iii) combination sampling: sampling from both risky and non-risky transactions using the 
Gibbs sampling approach to define the portions of each transaction class in the resulting 
data 
The DSDP system we investigated recorded the information per transaction of 20 features. Detecting 
anomalies with such complex features is not a trivial task, especially as it is difficult to determine 
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what counts as a true positive anomaly without consulting the SO about each transaction (the data is 
unlabeled).   
Since we want to investigate the impact of sampling strategy based on the new risk feature on the 
results of anomaly detection we concentrate on producing low-complexity data to simulate the data 
sampled for audit. Anomalies are introduced randomly into the data, so the anomaly detection system 
can be evaluated in a controlled environment (the experiment data is labeled).  
3.1 Data creation 
We represent the user as a Gaussian distribution which produces a series of observations. An 
anomaly is created by sampling a data point obtained from a distribution different from that of the 
user. We generated 1,000 users, and for each user a series of observations. The generated 
observations contained 1% anomalies, an observation generated from a different Gaussian. We added 
a new feature to the data - A risk label,  generated randomly in an independent manner for each 
observation, and 30% of the observations were labeled as risky. 
3.2 Anomaly detection 
We simulated the following anomaly detection system for each user: (1) Each observation may be 
sampled for audit. (2) If it is sampled, it is compared to the previous series of sampled observations. 
(3) The user's Gaussian is estimated using the mean and standard deviation. (4) An observation is 
marked as an anomaly by the mock system if the observation value difference from the user's mean 
is greater than three standard deviations. 
Each sampling method was applied three times with different random seeds, and the results were 
averaged. We sampled at four proportions: 35%, 30%, 25%, and 20%. The sampling posteriors 
(proportion of each class in the sample) for the "combination sampling" method were set at 80% for 
the risky class and 20% for the non-risky class 
4. RESULTS 
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Without sampling and when applied to all of the data generated, the simulated anomaly detection 
system detected 57% of the anomalies with precision of 64%, with no significant difference between 
the observations labeled as high-risk or low-risk. 
We compare the recall of the generated anomalies between the sampling methods, and the results are 
divided by class (high-risk / low-risk). The vanilla sampling method produced the same recall for 
both classes - as the high-risk class is less frequent, the recall for this class is low. The "risky only" 
sampling method achieved high recall for the high-risk class at the price of zero recall for the low-
risk class. The "combination sampling" method achieves recall slightly lower than "risk only" on the 
high-risk class, while still capturing some of the anomalies in the low-risk class. See Figure 2 for a 
comparison of the recall for the two classes. 
5. DISCUSSION 
Choosing the right sampling strategy is an important decision when designing and implementing a 
DSDP system. We have shown that introducing transaction risk into the anomaly detection sampling 
process can significantly affect the results. In our experiment there was no underlying difference 
between the high and low-risk classes, we expect these transactions to behave differently in real life, 
amplifying the effect of the sampling algorithm on the observed anomalies. 
The risk captures the likelihood that an SO would investigate the anomaly [12], however the 
investigation will be more thorough if low-risk transactions are also captured for the suspect user. 
The "risky only" method would not provide this level of resolution, while the naïve vanilla sampling 
would not detect most of the high-risk anomalies. Using a Gibbs sampling approach to provide 
Figure 2(a) recall for low-risk anomalies – vanilla sampling produces the best result (b) recall for high-risk 
anomalies – "risky only" has the higher recall. 
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"combination sampling," guaranteeing sampling mainly from the high-risk class provides a middle 
ground. The proportion of each class can be tuned by the SO to fit the organizational needs (the 
"risky only" method is simply "combination sampling" with the proportion of high-risk samples set 
to one). 
We are working on applying a similar type of analysis to a sample of real data, as well as more 
complex anomaly detection methods. Other future work should include a usage study of the effect of 
different sampling strategies on the adoption and use by security officers. Another venue for future 
work is to combine data compression methods with sampling for improving both anomaly detection 
and the ability to investigate afterwards. 
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